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  Abstract 
In this paper it is asked whether it is meaningful to state a ‘right to work’ as a basic human 
right to be written down in the constitution, for example, whether working time should 
generally be reduced, and whether those who do not have (or find) a job should get a 
guaranteed minimal income. All three demands have to be rejected, at least in the radical 
form in which they are often stated. They cannot be realised at all or at least not without 
impairing other basic human rights. Finally, it is asked what can be retained from these 
(usually well-intended) demands. 
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[1] The functioning of the labour market or its regulation, respectively, is quite often the object 
of claims with an ethical demand, be it the demand for a right to work, a more equal distribution 
of the existing labour or a minimum wage.
1) This is not astonishing as the labour market has 
some rather peculiar properties. On the one hand, it is functioning like any other market; there is 
supply and demand, and a contract is agreed upon whenever the wage offered for a job is higher 
than the reservation wage (i.e. the minimum wage that would be accepted) of the person who 
demands this job. On the other hand, labour markets are of utmost importance for most people 
in our society. We still live in a labour and consumption society where paid employment is cru-
cial and the possibilities for consumption depend substantially on our labour income. These pos-
sibilities determine to a large extend the participation chances in our society. Thus, self-esteem 
as well as personal welfare largely depend on whether we have paid employment and on what 
kind of work we do. Only a very small part of the population is wealthy enough to finance a de-
cent human life without any additional labour income. This means that most of those who do not 
have such an income sooner or later become dependent on others or on the government by re-
ceiving social assistance. The latter in particular not only largely reduces their consumption pos-
sibilities, but also impairs their self-esteem. As more recent studies for several countries show, 
unemployed persons are – ceteris paribus, i.e. with the same income – less satisfied with their 
life than employed people.
2) 
[2] Because the labour market is so crucial for the life of the members of our modern society, 
there are strong incentives to regulate this market. On the one hand, this is done by establishing 
unions of employers and employees, i.e. bilateral cartels, in order to improve the bargaining 
situation in this market. On the other hand, the market is controlled by governmental regula-
tions, for example with regard to occupational safety measures, minimum wages, or layoff rules. 
Such regulations do not necessarily, but might have the effect that the equilibrium in this market 
is lost because supply is larger than demand (oversupply) or demand larger than supply (over-
demand). Overdemand does not pose any problems because rising wages will reinstall equilib-
rium, while oversupply causes problems because it leads to ‘involuntary unemployment’, i.e. a 
situation in which there are potential employees who are willing to accept a job in line with the 
existing wages and working conditions and who are also qualified for this work but who do not 
find a job because employment is ‘rationed’.  
[3] In fact, Europe has been in such a situation since a long time. There is mass unemployment 
in many countries, sometimes with unemployment rates above 20 percent, in some regions even 
above 50 percent.
3) This development started in the seventies of the last century, and while there 
                                                           
 1.  See, for example, papers in this volume, but also A. GORZ (1989), PH. V. PARIJS (1991, 1992, 1995), or P. 
ULRICH (1995, 1996).  
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was some indication of a significant reduction of the unemployment rate in recent years, the new 
financial and economic crisis threatens to lead (at least in some countries) to even higher levels 
of unemployment than before. At the moment, politics does not seem to be able to turn around 
this development.  
[4]  Depending on the political view, there are different perspectives of this development. 
People on the right (bourgeois) side of the political spectrum, who have (at least to a large ex-
tent) accepted the neo-liberal paradigm of economic policy, complain that mainly labour mar-
ket regulations lead to the obvious malfunctioning of this market. They therefore demand de-
regulations, i.e. a reduction (or even abolishment) of minimum wages, a softening of layoff 
rules, or a reduction of unemployment benefits.
4) Only a liberation of the labour market from 
its (governmental and other) ties can in the long run reinstall full employment. Positive exam-
ples of this approach can be seen in the United States, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, but 
also in the Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, where employment has increased 
since the beginning of the nineties.
5) Last but not least, the Hartz legislation has contributed to 
a reduction of German unemployment during recent years.
6) 
[5] People on the left side of the political spectrum take quite a different stance. In their per-
spective, Germany has followed such a policy not only since the Hartz reforms but already 
since the ‘change’ in 1982 or at least since the beginning of the nineties, though without much 
success. In the Kohl area, besides other measures, property taxes were abolished and contin-
ued pay in the case of sickness as well as unemployment benefits were reduced, but there was 
no or at least no visible effect on unemployment. The same holds for the tax reductions during 
the first part of the Schröder government. The positive examples of the United States and the 
United Kingdom (and perhaps also of the German Hartz reforms) are acknowledged, but this 
goes at the expense of a growing number of ‘working poor’, i.e. of employees who do have a 
job but who do not earn enough for a decent human life.
7) From this perspective, a fundamen-
tal re-orientation of labour market policy is necessary.
8)  
[6] We are therefore in a situation where, depending on the political (ideological) point of 
view, completely different conclusions are drawn from the failure of conventional labour 
market policies. It is possible to claim that these policies were wrong, the proof being their 
failure. But it is also possible to claim that they were unsuccessful because they were not 
                                                           
  4. In Germany, this position is taken in particular by the ‘Stiftung Marktwirtschaft’. See, for example, 
Deutschland im Reformstau, Argumente zu Marktwirtschaft und Politik Nr. 73, Oktober 2002, p. 3ff. 
(http://www.stiftung-marktwirtschaft.de/module/argument73.pdf, 05/04/09). But see also H. SIEBERT (1997) 
or N. BERTOLD (2001), as well as the critique of this orthodox view by D.R. HOWELL, A. GLYN, D. BAKER 
and J. SCHMITT (2007). 
 5.  See for this the corresponding contributions in H. SARFATI and G. BONOLI (2002). – For an overview of the un-
employment development in the OECD countries since the last 20 years, see OECD (2008, pp. 261ff.). 
 6.  For a cautiously positive (but not undisputed) evaluation of the Hartz IV-reforms see SACHVERSTÄNDIGENRAT 
(2007, pp. 341ff.). 
 7.  See, for example, P. ULRICH (1996, p. 21).  
 8.  See, for example, A. GORZ (1989). – 3 – 
 
forceful enough, and that today’s situation could be much worse if the measures of the Kohl 
and Schröder governments had not been implemented. It is possible to argue for both posi-
tions consistently and plausibly.  
[7] The three perhaps most important policy options proposed by the critics of conventional 
labour market policy are the right to work, a general reduction of working time, and a guaran-
teed, unconditional minimal income, be it in the form of a basic income or a negative income 
tax.
9) However, such proposals only make sense if they can be realised at all and without ma-
jor negative side effects. Thus, before such demands are raised, their feasibility should be 
checked.
10) 
[8] This is to be done in this paper. We will ask whether it is meaningful to state a ‘right to 
work’ as a basic human right that is written down, for example, in the constitution (Section 2), 
whether working time should generally be reduced (Section 3), and whether those who do not 
have (or find) a job should receive a guaranteed minimal income (Section 4). The result of our 
analysis is that all three demands have to be rejected, at least in the radical form in which they 
are often stated. They cannot be realised at all or at least not without impairing other basic 
human rights. Finally, it is asked what can be retained from these (usually well-intended) de-
mands (Section 5). 
2  The ‘Right to Work’ 
[9] Should we include the ‘right to work’, i.e. the right for a job with a sufficient wage to en-
sure a decent human life, as a basic human right into the national constitution, as this is done, 
for example, in article 23, clause 1, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the 
United Nations: “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.”?
11) This is exactly 
what is sometimes demanded.
12) For such a demand to make sense, two conditions have to be 
fulfilled: First, it has to be justified why, in particular, a right for paid employment is de-
manded. Despite the fact that this demand currently has many adherents, it is by no means 
                                                           
 9.  The claim for a guaranteed, unconditional basic income is the most popular one of these three claims at the 
moment. In 2006, there was even a new journal founded on this issue, “Basic Income Studies”. 
10.In particular in Germany, there is also a discussion about minimum wages, but there the objective is not a re-
duction of unemployment but the prevention of a class of working poor, even at the expense of some in-
crease of unemployment. See for this debate, for example, J.J. DOLADO, F. FELGUEROSO and J.F. JIMENO 
(2000), R. BOADWAY and K. CUFF (2001) and A. KNABE and R. SCHÖB (2008). 
11. For a discussion of this right see, for example, G. MUNDLAK (2007) or M. RISSE (2007). 
12. See, for example, the „Resolution über die Verankerung des Rechtes auf Arbeit im Grundgesetz der Bun-
desrepublik Deutschland“ in J. MOLTMANN (1979, pp. 147f.), but see also W. PFANNKUCHE (1996). U. 
STEINVORTH (1996) also voted for such a right, but in the current volume (2009) he instead advocates a 
‘right to develop one’s capabilities’ which finally results in a demand for a basic income. – The right to 
work discussed here is totally different from the conception of the ‘Right-to-Work Laws’ in some U.S. 
states like Nevada, Utah, or Idaho. The purpose of these laws was that workers do not have to join a trade 
union or pay union member fees in order to get a job. See for this, for example, W.J. MOORE (1998) or E.M. 
DINLERSOZ and R. HEMÁNDEZ-MUURILLO (2002). – 4 – 
 
trivial to provide such a justification. No member of our society is forbidden to work, and 
there are many opportunities. The problem is to find an employment with an acceptable sal-
ary. Moreover, paid work is often not very pleasant; if we were not forced to work in order to 
finance our life, many of us would abstain from work (or at least from its unpleasant parts). 
But why should something be written into the constitution that many of us do not really strive 
for, because we only need it as a means for other purposes? Second, it has to be shown that 
the entitlements of the individuals resulting from such a constitutional right can be realised 
without (or at least without largely) impeding other basic rights of the individuals. 
[10]  An attempt could be made to justify such a right with the argument that, as mentioned 
above, paid employment is the usual way to earn income in our society and that income is not 
only necessary to secure physical subsistence but that it also provides the means for a full par-
ticipation in our society.
13) It will hardly be questioned that people in our society need an in-
come, but this argument does not imply that such an income necessarily has to come from 
paid employment. The argument shows at best that individuals have to have some – culturally 
determined – minimal income, and that this income has to be above the physical subsistence 
income. This right might be connected to the obligation that, if possible, individuals have to 
do some work benefitting those who pay them; yet this does not include the right to a suffi-
ciently paid employment in the (private) official economy. 
[11]  Thus, a right to a sufficiently paid employment has to be justified differently. One might 
try to justify it by the self-esteem often connected with paid employment. However, this ar-
gument is not convincing either. Besides paid employment, there are many other ways to ac-
quire self-esteem, for example by doing voluntary work in politics or social (non-profit) or-
ganisations or by bringing up children. This does not have always to be the case, but it can be, 
and self-esteem stemming from paid work would only be a strong argument for a right to 
work if this were the only or one of very few ways to acquire self-esteem. But this is not the 
case. There are many people who work to secure their livelihood and who do not gain any 
self-esteem from this work, but rather from other activities. Thus, the argument of self-esteem 
cannot provide a (convincing) justification for a right to work. KARL MARX, for example, 
considered wage labour, which is at stake here, as being ‘estranged labour’ and he hoped that 
it would be dispensable in the long-run.
14) The claimed right to work is just a right to this es-
tranged labour. 
[12]  It might be argued that the (non-contested) fact that today paid employment is usually 
the basis of a personal income, allowing for full participation in society and finally also for 
self-esteem, is sufficient to justify a right to (paid) work. Relevant are those people who in-
tend to do paid work for these motivations, but who are, for whatever reason, prevented from 
                                                           
13. Attempts to justify a right to work which came to the conclusion, though, that such a justification is not pos-
sible, have been performed, for example, by J. ELSTER (1988) or P. RIPPE (1995). 
14. See for this, for example, his elaborations about ‘Estranged Labour’ in K. MARX (1844, Part XXIIff.). – On 
the other hand and considering only paid labour, O. v. NELL-BREUNING states that every human work has 
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doing it, and not those who, also for whatever reason, do not intend to do such work. It is 
open to everybody not to use a right he or she is entitled to. 
[13]  Then, at the latest, the question arises how this should be realised. In our society it is 
hardly possible to force single individuals (employers) to employ other people. This also 
holds for unions or associations: an employers’ association can, for example, not force its 
members to create new jobs. And even if that were possible, a single employer cannot be 
forced to employ a particular unemployed person. This even applies if there are vacancies, 
should this specific unemployed person not have the necessary qualification. At best, it could 
be demanded that this person should get some money from this firm, and the firm should have 
the right to demand some work from him or her. As far as no suitable job is available, though, 
this is just another kind of hidden unemployment, where the unemployment compensation is 
paid by a private firm and not by the government. This would increase the wage bill of this 
firm and perhaps even endanger other jobs. Moreover, such an employment or unemploy-
ment, respectively, would hardly foster self-esteem. A legal claim against private employers 
on paid employment is therefore no option. 
[14]  What remains is a legal claim against the government. It might have the obligation to 
provide all unemployed with paid employment. The government would thereby become their 
employer in public firms. This, however, creates several other problems as experiences with 
‘second labour markets’ show. If the public firm is in competition with a private one, i.e. if it 
produces the same goods as private firms, some of the latter will be crowded out and the jobs 
created in public firms will lead to the destruction of jobs at other places. The total effect on 
employment might even be negative, because the public firms will be less efficient due to the 
lower qualification of their employees. Therefore nothing is gained. This approach might 
even induce a spiral, and the government might end up being the only employer (in this sector 
of the economy). Not only the experiences of the ‘real existing socialised economies’ in East-
ern Europe before 1990, where the right to work was – more or less – existing, show that this 
system hardly leads to a satisfactory societal solution. The reasons are the well-known infor-
mational problems which were largely discussed in the debate about the possibility of a com-
petitive socialism between O. LANGE and L. V. MISES and which demand a decentralised or-
ganisation of the economy, as often highlighted by F.A. V. HAYEK.
15) 
[15]  Thus, public firms have to supply goods or services that are not produced by private 
firms. Today there is in fact a large area where labour could be productive but is not em-
ployed. This holds, for example, for large parts of the caring institutions. There is a demand 
for those services, but it does not appear on the market. The main reason for this is that hardly 
anybody is willing and/or able to pay market prices for these services. The government is al-
ready largely engaged in this sector, for example with public hospitals, but its involvement 
could still be extended. The main problem is how to finance it. Where private firms are unable 
to find a break-even, in most situations neither can the government. If the governmental in-
volvement should be extended, additional money would be required. These jobs must sub-
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stantially be financed through additional tax revenue, even if part of it would be re-financed 
by reduced unemployment payments. 
[16]  This, however, causes other problems. The first one concerns the relatively simple ques-
tion of how this measure is to be financed. A general tax increase would reduce the purchas-
ing power of those who have to pay these taxes and might, therefore, endanger jobs at other 
places. The financing problem could be reduced considerably if the government would pay 
significantly lower wages than the private economy for equivalent jobs. This is done, for ex-
ample, in Germany with respect to the civilian service, insofar as young men are employed in 
the social sector but do only get the military service payment for draftees, which is much be-
low the wages usually paid in the caring sector. However, this example shows exactly the 
problems of such measures. First, it is a coercive measure that would hardly be possible in the 
private economy. Second, the amount of this payment (including the in-kind payment due to 
free accommodation and food) might be sufficient for a young man without family to finance 
his subsistence, but this wage is below the poverty limit and, under normal conditions, in no 
way sufficient. In Germany, these measures can be financed only under the above-mentioned 
conditions, though. Third, these people are not in direct competition with workers seeking 
employment in the private sector. They therefore do not crowd out employment there.
16) 
[17]  This shows the conditions that have to be fulfilled if such a second labour market is to 
increase employment. First, goods and services have to be supplied which are not produced in 
the private economy in order to prevent a crowding-out effect. Second, wages (for compara-
ble employments) have to be significantly below those in the first labour market, not only to 
prevent incentives to switch from the first to the second labour market, but also to give those 
in the second market incentives to search for jobs in the first labour market.
17) Both conditions 
imply that employment in the second market will hardly lead to the same self-esteem as em-
ployment in the first labour market. Employees in the second labour market will rather feel as 
second-class employees, and they will justifiably demand equal pay for equal work. This, 
however, leads to the problems mentioned above. 
[18]  Thus one has to agree with J. ELSTER (1988) and K.P. RIPPE (1995): “Every right to 
work which could be implemented is not desirable. It is impossible to realise a right to work 
connected with appreciation and self-esteem. Demanding such a right makes no sense.” (K.P. 
RIPPE (1995), pp. 70f.)
18) If a right to work should really be a right that could be sued, either 
                                                           
16. Nevertheless, some crowding out occurs: Public hospitals would need more regular employees if they could 
not fall back on those in the civilian service.  
17. U. STEINVORTH (1996, S. 94), arguing for a right to work, concedes this: “The rule could even be added that 
the wages for publicly initiated work are lower or the conditions stronger than in the private sector, if only 
some standards would be kept to.”  
18. See for this also F. FURGER who classifies the right to work as a social human right but simultaneously con-
cedes that this right “does not imply a direct legal claim for the single individual. The community could en-
sure this only under the condition of eventually forcing people to do some jobs and a limitation of individual 
freedom and personal human rights that is hardly tolerable.” (1992, pp. 163f.) – Both, P. KOLLER (2009, p. 
9) as well as U. STEINVORTH (2009, p. 1) also agree that a right to work can, at best, be a moral claim to get – 7 – 
 
the rule of equal pay for equal work would have to be violated by the government, which 
would considerably impair appreciation and self-esteem, or the government would in the long 
run (at least in some sectors of the economy) become the only employer and this would be the 
end of our liberal economic order. Such a right to work could at best be described as the obli-
gation of the government to make every effort to achieve high employment in order to ensure 
that as many employees as possible find a suitable job. The above-mentioned article 24 of the 
Human Rights Declaration is no more than this, and such an obligation is also already laid 
down in article 1 of the German Stability and Growth Law of June 8, 1967, though it could 
not prevent the huge increase of unemployment since the seventies. This does not imply that 
this obligation should be abolished, but one should not expect too much from such formulas.  
3  Reduction of Working Time 
[19]  If it is not possible to guarantee everybody an adequate job by writing a right to work 
into the constitution, then, the argument goes, all available jobs should at least be distributed 
more equally and therefore more justly. This might be done by a reduction of the working 
time.
19) The usual way of doing this has been to demand a reduction of the weekly working 
time, especially the 35-hour week, but with a perspective of a further reduction to 20 to 25 
hours.
20) The starting point is the popular rule of three. The quantity of available employment 
is assumed to be constant. The number of employed people is the quantity of available em-
ployment (measured in annual working hours) divided by the annual working time per em-
ployee. If the working time is reduced, employment is increased correspondingly. Originally, 
this reduction was demanded, by the German trade unions, for example, without cuts in pay, 
i.e. with full wage compensation. This would increase labour unit costs, which could endan-
ger employment at home and lead to a transfer of jobs to other countries. As this would con-
tradict the intention of the working time reduction, meanwhile this demand was dropped. 
Consequently, today the claim for a working time reduction is usually combined with a re-
quest to the employed employees to accept the necessary wage reduction in favour of the un-
employed.
21) 
[20]  It is not to be disputed that future development might lead to a further reduction of the 
weekly working time. This will not necessarily be the case, but it is possible. There is no 
compelling reason why the trend of recent decades should break off. The reason for this trend 
is probably that the demand for leisure time is increasing with rising income. It is to be ques-
tioned, however, whether such a reduction should be administered from above. Not only legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
an employment allowing a decent life in our society but is not a right to be secured by some governmental 
institution. 
19. See, for example, A. GORZ (1989, pp. 269ff., pp. 319ff.), but also P. KOLLER (2009, p. 12) who demands 
“the limitation of working hours” as well as “the restriction of multiple incomes” as elements of a policy “to 
achieving the greatest possible extent of employment”. 
20. See, for example, P. ULRICH (1995, S. 51). 
21. O. v. NELL-BREUNING (1985, S. 72ff.) also argues against full wage compensation using ethical arguments. – 8 – 
 
restrictions are problematic, but also those in collective wage contracts, as far as they contra-
dict the needs and wishes of the employees. This is important in particular when it is totally 
open whether such a reduction will help to reduce unemployment. 
[21]  Thus, in a first step the conditions have to be defined under which a reduction of the 
working time without wage compensation will increase employment. The rule of three men-
tioned above at least implicitly assumes that the redistribution of employment will not in-
crease average costs. This means that (at least) two conditions have to be fulfilled: First, no 
additional capital (equipment) is necessary. This holds, for example, if a factory producing 24 
hours per day is switching from three to four shifts. The situation is quite different, though, 
when there is only one shift in a plant and the common working time is reduced, which is the 
rule today.
22) The necessary creation of new (physical) working places increases the capital-
output ratio. If the production costs are to be kept constant, the working time reduction has to 
be connected with a reduction of the wage per hour (instead of a partial or even full wage 
compensation). Thus it is possible that costs increase and labour demand decreases, even 
without wage compensation. If social security contributions are, as usually, related to wages, 
cost pressure further increases because the basis for these contributions shrinks. If insurance 
benefits are not to be reduced, contributions have to be increased. This further reduces the net 
income of employees. It is therefore theoretically open whether a reduction of the weekly 
working time would lead to an increase or a reduction of employment.
23) If, however, a reduc-
tion of the workweek leads to an increase in labour productivity, this could at least partly be 
compensated. But this fact would also reduce the incentive for the creation of new employ-
ment opportunities because the production loss would partly be compensated by increased 
productivity. In any case, it is to be expected that even without compensation, at best a part of 
the lost working hours would be compensated by new employment. 
[22]  The second condition is that the transmission of information, i.e. when the work is 
handed over to the next employee, does not cause any problems. This should usually be the 
case with respect to assembly-line work. Therefore, the introduction of the 28-hour workweek 
by Volkswagen in 1994 is a good example to show where such a working time reduction can 
be handled without problems.
24) Generally speaking, this should be possible whenever the in-
formation set is limited and the transmission can easily be standardised. Another example for 
this is the transmission of information about hospital inpatients. Problems arise, on the other 
hand, whenever this kind of standardisation is impossible or only possible at the expense of a 
considerable information loss. In such situations, information transmission becomes expen-
sive. This problem might – at least partly – be lessened if the work is differently portioned, if, 
for example, it is distributed among 8 instead of 7 employees. However, this approach de-
                                                           
22. This holds, of course, also for services. 
23. For theoretical papers about a reduction of the working time see, for example, the seminal paper by L. 
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mands additional working places, thereby increasing costs again, and furthermore it is not al-
ways possible. Scientists might, for example, work in a team, but it is not possible for two 
scientists to halve their reading time and still be expected to possess the same knowledge for 
their research as before because their knowledge would then be fragmented.  
[23]  This indicates that a shortening of the workweek might only lead to a very limited crea-
tion of new employment (if at all) and, consequently, only to a small reduction of unemploy-
ment.
25) One might argue against this that a wage reduction should be accepted if this should 
appear to be really necessary.
26) After all, the objective is that all those who intend to be em-
ployed are employed, and a reduction of the nominal wage may partly be compensated by 
lower social security contributions, which increases real net wages. Moreover, these argu-
ments are directed against a shortening of the workweek and do not necessarily apply to other 
kinds of working time reduction as well. The same arguments might (at least in small and 
medium enterprises) also hold for a prolongation of the vacation, but the situation is different 
if sabbaticals are introduced or granted more often. In this case, no additional working places 
have to be created. However, this might only be feasible without problems for large firms. 
Medium sized or small enterprises, which might only have one employee for a specific area, 
would be faced with the problem to train a temporary employee, entailing non-negligible 
costs again. Moreover, such firms might come into financial problems if one out of very few 
employees requires a sabbatical and the firm is required to hire a temporary employee. Such 
cases could be subsidised, partly by the government, but then the public finance problems 
mentioned above arise again. 
[24]  Taking all these arguments together, a legally prescribed reduction of the working time 
would at best lead to a small reduction of unemployment. Nevertheless, such a measure could 
still be supported because at least it goes into the ‘right’ direction. There are, however, several 
other problems, at the positive as well as at the normative level. Let us consider the claim of 
P. ULRICH (1996, p. 27) for the “institutionalisation of a general civil right for a normalised 
life working time” and let us assume that somebody was studious and hard working and there-
fore fulfilling his ‘normalised life working time’ by the age of fifty. This could be easily 
achieved if the regulated average weekly working time is 35 or even only 30 hours. Can we 
deny the right of this person to seek for further paid employment? And which police state 
measures should be employed to enforce this limit? And what about the wealth of our society 
if, in particular, highly productive (and motivated) people, who usually work longer than the 
average employee, are forced into (very) early retirement? Are we not faced with the problem 
that, given today’s unemployment, this is already done much too often? And should the gov-
ernment be advised to enforce this even more? 
                                                           
25. Additionally, it has to be taken into account that the unemployed usually do not have the qualifications nec-
essary for newly installed working places. This would again reduce the employment effect of the working 
time reduction. On the relevance of this ‘mismatch-unemployment’ for Germany see, for example, H. 
ENTORF (1996).  
26. However, this demand is problematic for low income earners whose salaries are often not much above the 
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[25]  If at all, a life working time, limited by legal regulations, can therefore only be enforced 
by a reduction of the weekly working time, additional vacation (including sabbaticals) or 
early retirement. All three solutions have severe problems. But how can compulsory measures 
against the preferences of many people affected by them be justified at all? What is the moral 
or ethical justification to prohibit citizens from working longer and having higher incomes, if 
this is what they really want? And what reactions do we have to expect? 
[26]  One often-heard argument is that only a significant and legally enforced reduction of 
the weekly working time leads to an equable distribution of employment work among both 
sexes.
27) Thus, a public intervention into the inner-familiar division of labour is demanded, to 
make the private room public, as S. BAUM (1995, S. 32) states. However, the Scandinavian 
experience, where the female labour participation rates are quite close to the male rates, 
shows that a more equal distribution can also be brought about by other measures and without 
such a strong public intervention into the private sphere.
28) Moreover, the moral justification 
for strong interventions (with their side effects) is still unclear. Even if there are good reasons 
for a more equal distribution of paid and homework within the families, this must not neces-
sarily be the case in every single family. And what about those who do not have small chil-
dren (or old parents needing care, respectively): Are they also prevented to work more than 
25 hours per week? How can such a restriction of personal freedom, which contributes noth-
ing to a more equal distribution of labour among the sexes, be justified? Do we want, for ex-
ample, a publicly organised and legally enforced nursing service where every man and every 
woman has to work 10 hours every week? Such an authoritarian and enforcing state can 
hardly be the solution for today’s unemployment problem. 
[27]  However, there is another, and perhaps somewhat better argument for a general reduc-
tion of the working time. It can be seen as a public good benefiting all of us. Let us assume 
that, according to our preferences, a weekly working time of 38 hours would be optimal. In-
dividually, it would even be better for us if all others kept to this limit except ourselves. If this 
holds for all of us, everybody has an incentive to behave as a free rider. The only way to 
achieve the socially optimal situation is a generally agreed and implemented upper limit. This 
argument might be used to justify such a limitation even if we observe that such limits are al-
ways transgressed wherever attempts are made to install them. Interpreting such a limit as a 
merit good could lead to a similar result. Then it must be distinguished between actual and 
superordinated (moral) preferences and it must be assumed that we intend to have such a limit 
according to our moral preferences but behave differently according to our actual, subordi-
                                                           
27. See, for example, S. BAUM (1995) or P. ULRICH (1995). 
28. The Swiss female labour participation rate is also very high. However, the average weekly working time is 
much below the one of men. Thus, the distribution of paid labour is considerably more unequal than is sug-
gested by figures of the participation rates. – 11 – 
 
nated preferences.
29) A legal restriction could be interpreted as a collective self-restraint and, 
according to S. MAITAL (1986), it would be a “welfare-improving constraint”.
30) 
[28]  However, such an attempt to justify a general limit of the weekly working time also has 
to take into account possible negative side effects. Aside from school education we rarely use 
compulsory measures to provide merit goods. Usually, incentives to consume such goods are 
increased with subsidies, and only their financing is done using compulsory measured, i.e. 
general taxes. 
[29]  All these arguments suppose that employment is indeed increased by a shortening of the 
working time. Empirical studies show, however, that this is highly questionable. This already 
holds for the first German studies undertaken in the eighties when the 35-hour week was a hot 
political topic. F. STILLE and R. ZWIENER (1983), for example, estimate that if the 35-hour 
week were introduced, only 40 percent of the theoretically possible employment increase 
would actually be realised. H. KÖNIG and W. POHLMEIER (1987) as well as K. KRAFT (1988) 
were even more sceptical with their empirical results. More recent empirical studies do not 
present a more optimistic picture either. They show three effects. First, after the introduction 
of the 35-hour week, wage compensation took place, which prevented a significant employ-
ment effect. J. HUNT (1999) shows this for Germany, O. N. SKANS (2004) for Sweden, and A. 
KAPTEYN, A. KALWIJ and A ZAIDI (2004) for a sample of 16 OECD countries. Second, the ac-
tual reduction of the working time was less than the formal reduction in standard hours, be-
cause overtime work was increasing.
31) Third, the resulting employment effects are ambigu-
ous. For France, B. CRÉPON and F. KRAMAZ (2002) find a negative effect, while M. ESTEVÃO 
and F. SÁ (2008) find no effect at all. J. HUNT (1999) finds a reduction of employment in 
Germany, while A. KAPTEYN, A. KALWIJ and A ZAIDI (2004) in their sample of 16 OECD 
countries identify positive direct but also negative indirect employment effects that nearly 
compensate the direct effects. Only G. BOSCH and S. LEHNDORFF (2001) find significant em-
ployment effects for several countries. Taking all available evidence together, though, the 
hope for an increase in employment by a reduction of the workweek is hardly supported by 
this evidence so far.
32) 
[30]  Moreover, if we force the individuals to officially work fewer hours per week than they 
want, several side effects might emerge. People will sidestep into the shadow economy if they 
can use their abilities there. It is not a coincidence that the size of the shadow economy is the 
higher the shorter the official working time is.
33) This can only (and only partly) be sup-
                                                           
29. Such distinctions are employed, for example, by H.G. FRANKFURT (1971) or A.K. SEN (1977).  
30. See for this also T.C. SCHELLING (1978, 1980) as well as the contributions in J. ELSTER (1987). Such a justi-
fication for merit goods is provided by G. BRENNAN and L. LOMASKY (1984). 
31. See, for example, O. N. SKANS (2004) for Sweden. 
32. See also K. CONRAD, H. KOESCHEL and A. LÖSCHEL (2005) who, in their CGE simulation study, do not find 
a negative employment effect for an increase of the workweek in Germany. 
33. The relation between the effective working time and the size of the shadow economy in a country was in-
vestigated by H. WECK (1983). (See, in particular, pp. 86ff.) – More recent surveys about the size of the – 12 – 
 
pressed by policy measures. Second, overtime work is increasing. If employers and employ-
ees commonly want longer working times, they will arrange this in order to evade govern-
mental regulations.
34) This is particularly the case if there are tax preferences for overtime 
work as had long been the case in West Germany. Third, the divide in working load, but also 
in income, between employees and self-employed (or those who have discretion about their 
working time, respectively) will increase. The latter can hardly be forced to work less, and 
they will hardly do so whenever it is not in accordance with their preferences. This might in-
crease the incentive to become self-employed, but also the incentive to dislocate employees in 
non-genuine freelancing (disguised employment). All these negative side effects, which can 
hardly be prevented and, if at all, only with a considerable amount of police operations, will 
probably more than offset the possible positive employment effects of a working time reduc-
tion. The claim for such a reduction can therefore hardly be justified even from an ethical per-
spective. 
4  Negative Income Taxes and Basic Income  
[31]  If it does not make sense to lay down a right to work in the constitution because the 
government cannot afford to implement this right (in a liberal society), and if a general reduc-
tion of the working time is no adequate means to fight mass unemployment, it is only natural 
to claim that all citizens should have a guaranteed income that covers at least their (culturally 
defined) subsistence. This claim is largely undisputed. In contrast, the amount of such an in-
come as well as the question of who should be entitled to it are disputed. Today, those who 
qualify for a guaranteed income are obliged to prove their need. This means that they are peti-
tioners vis-à-vis the public bureaucracy, giving the latter considerable discretionary power. 
This kind of assistance is not only in many cases economically inefficient,
35) but it also con-
tradicts consumer sovereignty or the autonomy of the person, respectively. What gives us the 
right to prescribe consumption possibilities for the poor, while we grant rich people full free-
dom to decide about their consumption? It is obvious that by doing so, the rights of people 
with low or even no own income are restricted. 
[32]  Two proposals were made to solve these problems that are, however, more or less iden-
tical: the negative income tax going back to J. RHYS-WILLIAMS (1943), but popularised by M. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
shadow economy are presented by F. SCHNEIDER and D.H. ENSTE (2000) as well as by F. SCHNEIDER 
(2007). 
34. The simultaneous occurrence of high unemployment and a high number of overtime hours as could be ob-
served, for example, in the Federal Republic of Germany, is, however, only partly due to short working 
time; a more important factor might be the restrictive layoff rules and the layoff costs resulting from these 
rules. Whenever the demand for their products increases, employers will in such a institutional environment 
hire additional workers only if they are pretty sure that the increased demand is enduring. As long as they 
have to take into account that this demand will probably be shrinking again, they will try to organise the ad-
ditional production as far as possible by using overtime (or by hiring people from temporary employment 
firms) in order to avoid additional costs resulting from layoffs which might become necessary later on. See 
for this, for example, H. SIEBERT (1989). 
35. See for this, for example, B.S. FREY and G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2002, pp. 279ff.). – 13 – 
 
FRIEDMAN (1962), and the idea of a guaranteed basic income.
36) According to both concepts, 
citizens receive an unconditional income. In the case of a basic income, the amount is trans-
ferred to them in regular (for example monthly) tranches and taken into account in the tax 
declaration that has to be completed later on. In the case of the negative income tax, the citi-
zen first has to hand in his tax declaration. If his income is above a certain limit, he has to pay 
taxes, if it is below this limit, he has to pay a ‘negative tax’, i.e. he receives a transfer. If he 
has no income at all, the transfer he gets is his guaranteed basic income. The financial means 
needed by the government to implement this system of a minimum income are in both cases 
the same, as always the same citizens are entitled to financial help. 
[33]  At a first glance, this concept of a guaranteed minimum income is extremely attractive. 
It would not only stop the discrimination of the citizens in the lowest part of the income scale, 
but also restrict the discretionary power of the (social) bureaucracy. Moreover, those who can 
only receive a low wage would still have an incentive to work. In the current system of social 
assistance such income is in many cases totally offset against the assistance payments, i.e. the 
marginal tax rate is (sometimes even more than) 100 percent. Thus, recipients of social assis-
tance often have no or at best rather weak incentives to accept a job in the official economy. 
The frequent (but quite often overestimated) complaint about the misuse of the social security 
system is virtually provoked by these incentives. Finally, the negative income tax allows for a 
wider spread of the wage scale and therefore supports the supply of jobs that are not competi-
tive given today’s minimum wages. Such jobs could be supplied without the fear that a class 
of working poor comes into existence. 
[34]  Given the many advantages of this system, it has to be asked why it has not been intro-
duced a long time ago. Of course, the social bureaucracy, as any other bureaucracy, might op-
pose it with all reasonable (and perhaps also unreasonable) arguments, because this system 
would reduce its discretionary leeway. However, such a ‘conspiracy assumption’ is hardly 
sufficient to explain why such a system has never been introduced despite some experiments 
in the United States and Canada between 1968 and 1980.
37) There are two major problems 
connected with this system, though. First, and this is the most important argument for the 
economist, this system can hardly be financed, and due of the enormous amount of money 
that would have to be raised by tax increases, it would not (or only to a small part) produce 
the intended positive employment effects. Second, this system is also highly debatable from 
an ethical perspective, because it would mean that hard-working citizens would subsidise lazy 
people. Thus, there are also ethicians who demand that such payments are only made under 
specific conditions.
38) 
                                                           
36. A (not entirely correct) comparison of the two concepts is given in B. SCHNEIDER (1995). An overview over 
the different variants is presented by R.E. LEU und CH. EISENRING (1998). See for such a demand also P. 
KOLLER (2009, p. 17) as well as U. STEINVORTH (2009, p. 7) in this volume. 
37. The experiences of these experiments are discussed in R.A. MOFFITT (2003) or K. WIDERQUIST (2005).  
38. See, for example, J. ELSTER (1989, p. 215f.). – 14 – 
 
[35]  First of all and (not only) from an economic perspective, the impact of such a system 
depends on the answers to two questions: who is entitled to such an income and what is the 
amount of this income. A reasonable approach for the latter answer might be the poverty line; 
the basic income should at least not be below this line because it has to guarantee subsistence. 
A usual assumption for the poverty line is 40 percent of the average income. If – without any 
conditionality – every citizen were entitled to the basic income, in a first step the government 
would have to distribute 40 percent of GDP per capita among the population. A large amount 
of this money would be taxed away again but this would require very high marginal tax rates. 
If the average tax rate for the mean income were only 20 percent, this would imply marginal 
tax rates of about 60 percent. If one takes into account that, for retired people, this provides 
only a minimum income, an additional old age pension system would be needed which further 
increases the marginal burden. This would generate considerable negative incentives to work 
in the official economy, but provide positive incentives to work in the shadow economy, 
thereby increasing the marginal burden even further. Thus, without any conditionality, a guar-
anteed basic income or negative income tax cannot be financed and is, therefore, also not fea-
sible. This applies all the more, the more generous the basic income is.
39) Thus, this system is 
not sustainable, even not in the sense of PH. v. PARIJS (1995, pp. 30ff.). 
[36]  It is often stated that such a system would not be more expensive than the current social 
security system.
40) This, however, would only be true if the set of those who are entitled were 
severely restricted. This is impossible, though, if it is to be a really general basic income 
which would imply that not only those who are willing to work and those who are unable to 
work because they are handicapped and/or do not find a job receive such an income, but also 
those who reject to do paid work, be it that they have other engagements or that they just want 
to enjoy leisure. According to PH. V. PARIJS, “real freedom consists in the possibility to be 
able to select among those lives one wants to enjoy.” (1995, pp. 32f.)
41) Thus, the working 
population, the unemployed and the pensioners would be entitled to this income, but also stu-
dents or partners of high income earners without an own labour income.
42) The result is not 
only that this system can hardly be financed, but that it also leads to those extremely high 
marginal tax rates that annihilate the positive primary working incentives or even revert 
them.
43)  
[37]  If such a system is to be introduced – and there are a number of good reasons in favour 
of it – a limitation of the group of those who are entitled to a basic income is unavoidable. It 
                                                           
39. A very generous basic income is demanded, for example, by B. SCHNEIDER (1995) or P. SCHABER (1996) 
but in particular by PH. V. PARIJS (1991, 1992, 1995). 
40. See, for example, P. ULRICH (1995, p. 48). 
41. To make this decision possible, PH. V. PARIJS demands not only a generous amount but the highest possible 
amount of this income. 
42. Even if a large part of this income is taxed away again, an unconditional system would imply a subsidy for 
earners of high non-wage income. If the marginal tax rate is 60 percent, they could still keep 40 percent of 
the basic income. 
43. Here, we do not discuss the (also relevant) question whether this would cause migrations.  – 15 – 
 
would make sense to include pensioned people (due to old age as well as a handicap). For 
those who are unemployed but able to work, payment should be conditional on their willing-
ness to work, as it is today with respect to unemployment insurance. Moreover, as done in 
some countries, it could be dependent on their work for the community, as long as appropriate 
jobs in a second labour market are available. The disadvantage is that a social bureaucracy 
would be needed again, even if it would be smaller than today, and that this bureaucracy 
would still have some discretionary power, in particular, if it must be decided whether some-
body really makes an effort to find a job. Thus, the concept loses some of its charm. 
[38]  But even then it is still not clear whether such a system can be financed. The main rea-
son is that today take-up rates are relatively low; in Switzerland, take-up rates for social assis-
tance are estimated to be only about 20 percent.
44) A general basic income would immediately 
require about five times more money than today, and this even if the group of those entitled 
would not change. R.E. LEU et al. (2007) prepared a study about the financial feasibility of an 
earned income tax credit system in Switzerland, presenting the first serious calculations for 
the introduction of such a system in Switzerland. These calculations show that abolishing the 
existing poverty traps alone would be rather costly and hardly possible without a reduction of 
the minimum income. Thus, the financial implications of this system are so severe that an un-
conditional basic income guaranteeing a decent life is impossible. There are, of course, quite a 
lot of proposals available, some even with calculations, that claim the feasibility of such a 
system.
45) All these proposals suffer from two major drawbacks, though. The proposed basic 
income is considerably below the poverty line and/or the take-up rates are underestimated. 
Thus, either the guaranteed basic income is too low to live a decent life, or the system cannot 
be financed.
46)  
[39]  Independent of whether such a system can be realised in a liberal society or not, the 
question can be asked whether it is morally right to make such payments unconditionally. It 
should be undisputed that those who are unable to take up employment as well as those who 
really make efforts to get employment but cannot find a job should be entitled. It is disputed, 
however, whether those who are able to work but do not want to should be entitled as well. 
The backside of the free decision between work and leisure for people who do not intend do 
work is that those who work in order to reach a higher than the minimum consumption level 
have to subsidise the others which makes working citizens feel exploited. Consequently, R.H. 
FRANK (1985, pp. 254ff.) as well as J. ELSTER (1988, pp. 215f.) argue against an uncondi-
                                                           
44. See R.E. LEU et al. (2007, p. 139).  
45. See for example, the citizens’ money (‘Bürgergeld’) as proposed by the German F.D.P. or the proposal of 
the CDU prime minister of Thüringen, DIETER ALTHAUS.  
46. See for this also P. HARVEY (2006). – The fact that “even conservative politicians and established econo-
mists agree that a basic income that ensures a decent life and does not reduce production is possible” (U. 
STEINVORTH (2009, p.8) does not yet ensure that it is really feasible. Concrete calculations as, for example, 
for Switzerland in R.E. LEU et al. (2007), show the contrary. – 16 – 
 
tional basic income, while for J. V. PARIJS (1991, 1992, 1995), for example, the unconditional-
ity is the precondition for a real freedom to choose between leisure and work.
47) 
[40]  The crucial question is whether there exists a moral duty of the working citizens to also 
provide those members of the society with the possibility of a decent life who are able to care 
for themselves but not willing to do so if they can avoid it. The above arguments which show 
that such a system would not be sustainable because the incentives to work would be so small 
that hardly anybody would have an interest to work (in the official economy) illustrate that 
such a duty cannot be justified. But one can at least perform the mental experiment and ask 
whether it could be justified if such a system were to function. But even then it is difficult to 
get a positive answer, despite the arguments presented by J. V. PARIJS. 
[41]  A suitable starting point is given by the contract theoretic approach, i.e. if the question 
is asked whether rational individuals behind a veil of ignorance would chose such a system of 
a guaranteed basic income. By following J.C. HARSANYI (1975, 1977) and applying the prin-
ciple of maximising expected utility, it is obvious that such a proposal would have to be re-
jected. It might, however, be accepted when applying the difference principle according to J. 
RAWLS (1971). Whether this is the case depends on the assumption about the least advantaged 
people. If they are those who can work but do not intend to work, following PH. V. PARIJS 
(1995), their income is to be maximised. A more reasonable assumption is, however, that the 
least advantaged people are those who would like to work but cannot do so, be it that they are 
unable due to physical reasons, or be it that they do not find a job. Following the difference 
principle their income is to be maximised. They are less privileged than the others because the 
voluntarily unemployed get only positive benefits from the leisure time connected with their 
unemployment while the involuntarily unemployed have to bear the psychic burdens men-
tioned above which for them are often even worse than the reduction of their monetary in-
come. However, their income will be reduced if those who can work but do not want to do so 
also get a basic income. This implies that the least advantaged group is worse off if the basic 
income is unconditional compared to a situation where it is conditional. This violates the 
Rawlsian difference principle. Thus, in both variants, this contract theoretic approach does 
not provide a moral justification for an unconditional basic income. 
[42]  The same holds if we start from the concept of exchange justice as proposed, for exam-
ple, by O. HÖFFE (1990, 1994). In this approach, not only private but also public activities are 
primarily seen as (voluntary) exchanges. If we rely on the individuals’ interests and demand 
that ethical norms should be acceptable to all affected individuals, voluntary exchange is a 
suited paradigm because all actions are performed with the consent of all affected individuals. 
Actually, many government activities, including parts of legally forced income redistribution, 
can be interpreted as voluntary exchanges.
48) Following this approach, the government (the 
working population who finances the social security system) can demand something in return 
for the transfers, at least as far as this is possible. For those who can work this would (at least) 
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be the willingness to work. Only those who cannot work (or do not have to work for other 
reasons) are entitled to a basic income. This can be derived from the principle of ‘corrective 
justice’, which becomes relevant whenever the principle of exchange justice cannot be ap-
plied, because one of the partners is unable to provide his contribution.
49) Thus, the principle 
of corrective justice is subsidiary to the principle of exchange justice.  
5 Concluding  Remarks 
[43]  The results of the three preceding sections can be summarised as follows: First, it does 
not make sense to claim a ‘right to work’ as an individual citizen’s right to get appropriate 
employment with an adequate wage. In a liberal and democratic society there is no addressee 
who could guarantee that this entitlement can always be met. Second, a general reduction of 
the working time is no suited means to (significantly) improve the current situation of mass 
unemployment. Finally, a general, unconditional basic income is not feasible. Moreover, it 
also holds that none of these three claims can be convincingly justified. In all three cases 
there are arguments against these claims that are at least as convincing as those brought for-
ward in favour of them. This even holds if we not only follow the contract theoretic approach 
by J. RAWLS (1971), but also if we apply his difference principle that we allow inequality only 
as far as it is beneficial for the least advantaged in our society.  
[44]  This sounds quite negative. It does, however, not change anything about the fact that 
today (mass) unemployment is a crucial economic and political problem and that politics as 
well as social sciences have the task, as far as ever possible, to find a remedy. Given today’s 
situation on the labour market, the following statements might be (largely) undisputed, i.e. 
subscribed by (nearly) all people, independent of their political and ethical position: 
(i)  If somebody becomes unemployed through no fault of his or her own, does not find a 
new job and has no other income, he or she shall be entitled to receive transfers that 
cover at least the expenses of the (culturally defined) subsistence level. 
(ii) Because involuntary unemployment usually does not only lead to a monetary loss but 
also imposes considerable psychic burdens on those affected, it is the task of the govern-
ment to provide conditions so that as many as possible searching a job also have the 
chance to find one.  
(iii) The emergence of a class of ‘working poor’ is to be prevented. If labour income is not 
sufficient to guarantee a decent life and if no other income is available, the government is 
obliged to pay at least the difference between the wage and the subsistence income. 
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(iv) Transfers by the government should be provided as unbureaucratically as possible, i.e. 
power and leeway of the social bureaucracy have to be restricted as far as possible.  
(v)  This presupposes that the social security system is financed in a sustainable way that is 
and will not be undermined by developments connected with globalisation and interna-
tional tax competition. 
On the other hand, the size of the transfers, their (un)conditionality and perhaps also the way 
they are to be financed are disputed. 
[45]  If unemployment is really to be reduced, new jobs have to be created primarily for those 
with low income and low (or even missing) qualification, because this is the segment of the 
labour market mostly affected by globalisation. This will hardly be possible without a larger 
spread in the wage scale. In order to still allow the workers most affected by this development 
to have a decent human life, additional payments by the government are necessary. Today, 
this is mostly done by the ‘earned income tax credit’, which has been applied, for example, in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. The results are only partly positive.
50) Similar 
proposals have also been made for Germany.
51) 
[46]  These additional payments might partly be financed by reduced unemployment benefits, 
but an increase of the government’s share cannot be excluded. At the same time, capital can 
be less taxed than in the past because of its higher mobility. Thus, we are confronted with a 
situation where the (financial) demands on the public sector increase while at the same time 
the revenue from the current tax system tends to decline.
52) If we want to escape this increas-
ing divergence, we cannot avoid substantial changes of public finances at the expenditure 
and/or revenue side. 
[47]  It has been shown that a system to finance our social security system can be found that 
is sustainable even under the conditions of today’s globalisation.
53) With respect to the tax 
system two directions have to be followed. First, the tax burden on enterprises has to be re-
duced. This holds in particular for those countries with still rather high corporate income 
taxes, and this is only possible by a higher burden on (natural) persons. Second, the tax bur-
den on income should be reduced and the one on consumption increased. If the burden on la-
bour income is reduced, this should be done rather by non-wage labour costs (social security 
contributions) than by a reduction of direct taxes. A (partial) shift from income to consump-
tion taxes would also allow steps towards an ecological tax reform by reducing the tax burden 
on labour but increasing the burden on environmentally detrimental activities. This can be 
done, for example, by energy and/or CO2 taxes.
54) 
                                                           
50. Regarding the experiences in these and other countries see, for example, R.L. LEU et al. (2007, pp. 113ff.), 
especially for the United Kingdom also R. BLUNDELL (2006).  
51. See, for example, the contributions in ifo Schnelldienst 4/2007.  
52. At the same time, the ageing population creates additional problems for the public finances. 
53. See for this G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998a). 
54. See for this, for example, G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1998). – 19 – 
 
[48]  Thus, there are possibilities to comply with the objectives mentioned above. They are 
‘economical’ in the sense that they start out from concrete interests of the individuals, and the 
proposed policy measures can be applied without violating basic human rights and liberties of 
the affected citizens. They are designed on the basis of the economic model of behaviour, the 
‘homo oeconomicus’,
55) i.e. it is assumed that the agents are autonomous individuals who re-
act rationally, in accordance with their preferences, to these policy measures. This model of 
human behaviour, stemming originally from economics, is today applied in many other social 
sciences as well, and despite all known weaknesses which are increasingly investigated also 
by economists, it is still the most fruitful approach in the social sciences and without any al-
ternative in economics as yet. 
[49]  Today, we often speak of the end of the labour society. The demand for reductions of 
the working time also goes into this direction. This hypothesis is not new; 160 years ago, 
KARL MARX believed the labour society to come to an end soon (after the revolution).
56) In 
reality, however, this might remain a nice dream for a long time to come (or possibly even 
forever). Thus, the measures proposed above do not exclude a shortening of the working time, 
but they also do not assume that paid employment will significantly be reduced even in the 
medium run. Despite high unemployment, we experience a quite different development today. 
Due to the increased female labour participation, paid employment has increased considerably 
in recent decades. A consequence of this development is that many services provided within 
the families in earlier times are now delivered via markets, i.e. with paid employment. This 
might be criticised as an ‘economisation of the Lebenswelt’ and a step backwards for society. 
Yet it must be accepted that this is a necessary consequence of women’s emancipation; in-
creasingly more women strive for their personal development in the professional sphere as 
well. This development will definitely not be reversed.
57) Thus, for the near future we can 
rather expect a further extenuation than a reduction of paid employment. This fact has to be 
taken into account when designing labour market policy measures. 
[50]  These considerations might be criticised as being too much ‘economically’ oriented. 
But a critical analysis of any economic policy measure, proposed by economists, ethicians, 
politicians or others, first of all demands a positive economic analysis although this is not 
everything that is needed. It cannot, in particular, substitute the political decision that has to 
be taken by the citizens and/or their representatives. These decisions should be informed, 
though, and to provide such information is the task of economic theorising. Thus, ethical dis-
courses dealing with economically relevant questions will hardly be able to do without a solid 
economic analysis of proposed norms or measures if one does not want to deceive oneself.
58) 
Due to the bridge principle ‘ultra posse nemo obligatur’, such an analysis is usually necessary 
                                                           
55. For a more detailed description of the economic model of behaviour see G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (2008). 
56. See for this his answer on the 20
th question “What will be the consequences … ” in the communist mani-
festo by K. MARX and F. ENGELS (1848). 
57. See for this more extensively G. KIRCHGÄSSNER (1997). 
58. See for this also G. GÄFGEN (1980). – 20 – 
 
if one does not want to miss the aspired objective (or to reach it at best by chance). The re-
sults of such an analysis might in many cases seem to be ‘destructive’, but they (hopefully) 
can save us from making some economic policy mistakes that often have high societal costs. 
A Nirvana approach comparing the current, unsatisfying situation with an ideal, but not real-
isable world does not help very much. What we need instead are practicable measures leading 
into the right direction, even if they represent only small steps. 
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